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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DIANNA BROADBENT, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 950241-CA 
930000119 
v. : 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE : Priority No. 15 
CACHE COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, : 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon the Utah 
Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1994) Pursuant to 
Utah Code §78-2-2(4) (1994), and Utah Code §78-2a-3 (2) (k) (1994), 
this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by reason of the 
transfer of this action from the Supreme Court of Utah to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Rule 42, Utah R. App. P. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue is whether the lower court correctly concluded there 
was no genuine issue of material fact as to (1) whether Broadbent's 
tort claim for wrongful discharge is barred by the Governmental 
Immunity Act, sections 63-30-1, et seq.; and (2) whether her 
supposition that there is a private right of action based on an 
alleged violation of the provisions of the Educator Evaluation Act, 
sections 53A-10-101, et seq., is similarly barred. 
Standard of Review: The trial court judge's determination 
that there are no disputed issues of material fact precluding 
summary judgment is a conclusion of law reviewed for correctness. 
Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 
1193, 1195 (Utah App. 1992); accord Weese v. Davis County Comm'n, 
834 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The determinative provisions are Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1, et 
seq.; 53A-10-101 through 110; and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. These provisions are reproduced in Addendum A to 
this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final judgment on an order dated 
October 13, 1994, of the First Judicial District Court of Cache 
County, the Honorable Gordon J. Low presiding, granting summary 
judgment to defendant Board of Education of the Cache County School 
District ("the District" or "the School District") on Broadbent's 
tort claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 
and violation of the Educator Evaluation Act when her employment as 
a provisional teacher was not renewed. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Broadbent filed her complaint against the District on August 
19, 1993 and claimed two bases for recovery: First, she argued she 
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was entitled to recovery under the public policy exception to the 
employment at-will doctrine; second, she alleged an implied private 
cause of action would lie for violation of the Educator Evaluation 
Act, sections 53A-10-101, et seq. R. 2 - 7. 
The District answered and discovery ensued. On June 24, 1994, 
the District moved for summary judgment on the basis that (1) the 
School District is immune from the tort of wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy; (2) plaintiff failed to file a timely 
statutory notice of claim with respect to her wrongful discharge 
claim; (3) plaintiff's Title 53A chapter 10 claim fails because (a) 
there is no waiver of immunity for a suit based on an alleged 
violation of its provisions, (b) there is no express or implied 
private right of action under this code section, (c) this section 
does nothing to alter the contractual relationship between the 
parties, and (d) plaintiff's testimony indicated clearly that 
attempts at remediation as envisioned by Title 53A chapter 10 would 
have been futile. R. 43 - 57, and attachments. 
On August 26, 1994, Judge Low issued a Memorandum Decision 
finding specifically that Broadbent's claim under the public policy 
exception to the employment at-will doctrine was barred as a tort 
claim against a governmental entity performing a governmental 
function. Additionally, the Judge found there was no basis for 
recovery under U.C.A. Title 53A, Chapter 10 which "includes no 
provisions for private causes of action to the tort of wrongful 
discharge, provides no claim of relief, and gives no reference to 
the establishment of a contractual right under the statute." R. 
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195 - 205, at 201. 
Final judgment in favor of the District was entered on October 
13, 1994. R. 207. Broadbent filed this appeal on September 22, 
1994. R. 210. 
Statement of Facts 
Undisputed Facts. 
1. The School District is a governmental entity performing a 
governmental function. 
That the defendant in this action, the Board of Education of 
the Cache County School District, is a governmental entity 
performing a core governmental function is uncontested by either 
party. 
2. Broadbent was a provisional teacher with no contractual 
modification of her at-will status. 
Broadbent understood that her employment with the School 
District was on a "year by year basis" and that she was a 
provisional, rather than tenured, educator. Broadbent depo. at 27, 
28, attached to the School District's Memorandum in Support of Its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 43 - 57. Moreover, Broadbent 
understood that as a provisional teacher, the District could decide 
not to renew her contract for any reason. Jd. , Broadbent depo. at 
29. 
Furthermore, according to the negotiated contract between 
Cache County School District and the teachers union representing 
Broadbent, new employees of the School District were informed that 
during the three years as provisional employees, "they shall be 
without the right of expectation of continued employment." Id. , 
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Section III.7.6.b.; in accord Section III.10.9.a.1. also attached 
to the District's Memorandum. Broadbent testified that she had 
never been told that merely because she had good evaluations, her 
employment would be renewed, .Id., Broadbent depo. at 38, nor that 
without evaluation and the opportunity for remediation, her 
provisional status could not be terminated, Broadbent depo. at 42 -
43. Broadbent offered no evidence of contractual modification of 
her at-will employment with the School District. 
3. Broadbent was advised in writing, prior to the end of her 
term as a provisional teacher, that her employment would not be 
renewed. 
On March 31, 1992, Broadbent was given two months' notice that 
her contract with the School District would not be renewed for the 
1992-1993 school year. Memorandum Decision, R. 196; Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 6, 11. Her teaching status, at the time of notification 
of non-renewal, was "provisional." Id. 
Disputed Facts. 
A. Reasons for non-renewal. 
Broadbent claims her employment was not renewed because she 
acted as an advocate for the special needs of a child. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 10. The School District claims Broadbent's employment 
was not renewed because she was insubordinate and that the District 
was acting in the best interests of the child. R. 43-57 
This dispute, however, is immaterial to the court's resolution 
of the District's motion for summary judgment since even if 
Broadbent's claims rise to the level of a clear and substantial 
public policy violation, the claim for wrongful discharge of an at-
5 
will employee sounds in tort, not contract, and is therefore barred 
by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
B. Whether the Educator Evaluation Act provisions were met. 
Broadbent claims she was never provided with written 
documentation identifying alleged deficiencies, resources for 
improvement, or a consulting educator. Appellant's Brief, p. 11. 
The District argues Broadbent was not a candidate for remediation 
since during her deposition, two years after her contract was not 
renewed, she remained firm in her position that she would again 
ignore her supervisor's direct orders if she disagreed with them. 
R. 43 - 57. 
This factual dispute is also immaterial because Broadbent had 
no expectation of continued employment, and the Educator Evaluation 
Act ("EEA") does not create a private right of action for which 
immunity is waived. 
Standard of Review. 
Given the narrowness of any modification to the at-will 
doctrine, if Broadbent's allegations, considered in the light most 
favorable to her, fail to establish a claim, the District is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
DuBois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Utah App. 1994). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) (citing Sandy City v. Salt 
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Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1992)). 
Summary judgment was appropriately entered on behalf of the 
District for two reasons. First, there is no waiver of 
governmental immunity for the tort of wrongful discharge of an at-
will employee. Second, any claim based on a violation of the EEA 
would also be barred by the Governmental Immunity Act. There is 
simply no recognizable waiver of immunity in this case; 
consequently, Broadbent's complaint fails as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO BASIS IN LAW OR FACT FOR 
BROADBENT'S CLAIM OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE. 
A. It is undisputed Broadbent was an "at-will" employee of 
the School District, 
1. As a provisional teacher, she could be fired for any 
reason, or for no reason at all. 
Broadbent has admitted she understood her employment 
relationship with the School District, at the time she was notified 
her contract would not be renewed, was as a provisional or "year by 
year" teacher. As an "at-will" employee, she had no expectation of 
continuing employment. In fact, she could be fired at any time 
prior to the end of her three year provisional term for any reason 
or for no reason at all. 
The general rule concerning personal employment contracts 
is, in the absence of some further express or implied 
stipulation as to the duration of the employment or of a 
good consideration in addition to the services contracted 
to be rendered, the contract is no more than an 
indefinite general hiring which is terminable at the will 
of either party... When an individual is hired for an 
indefinite time, he has no right of action against his 
employer for breach of the employment contract upon being 
7 
discharged. 
Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979). 
Utah courts have been reluctant to recognize the sufficiency 
of claims attempting to modify the at-will doctrine. See Evans v. 
GTE Health Systems, Inc., 857 P.2d 974, 977 (Utah App. 1993) 
(holding "general assurances of an ongoing working relationship are 
not sufficiently definite so as to rebut the at-will presumption"); 
Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331, 334-45 (Utah 1992) 
(reasoning "although Hodgson may have subjectively believed that 
her employment could be terminated only after a warning, the 
standards of unilateral offer and acceptance require that Hodgson 
reasonably believe the employment was other than at will, and this 
standard has not been met"); and Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 
771 P. 2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (recognizing a discharged employee 
may rebut the presumption that an employment contract is at-will by 
a showing that the parties expressly or impliedly intended a 
specified duration or agreed to terminate the relationship for 
cause alone). 
Broadbent has made no attempt in this case to raise a question 
of fact regarding any express or implied terms which may have 
modified her at-will status.1 Rather, she relies on the public 
xThe presumption of at-will status can be rebutted by strong 
evidence manifesting the employer communicated to the employee 
sufficiently definite modifications to induce a belief that the 
terms of employment are other than at-will. Sorenson v. Kennecott-
Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah App. 1994); Kirberg 
v. West One Bank, 872 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah App. 1994). Broadbent 
admits she was an at-will employee and offers no evidence of 
modification. 
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policy limitation to the at-will doctrine to support her claim 
against the District. 
2. The "public policy exception" is a narrowly confined 
limitation on the at-will doctrine. 
In Berube, three justices of the Utah Supreme Court in dictum 
agreed that the at-will employment doctrine arising from an 
indefinite-term employment contract is limited by a public policy 
exception. See 771 P.2d at 1042 (opinion of Durham, J., joined by 
Stewart, J.); 771 P.2d at 1051 (opinion of Zimmerman, J.). The 
lead opinion in Berube recognized that the term "public policy" is 
a vague and elastic term in need of limitation so as not to provide 
an arguable basis for a lawsuit every time an indefinite-term 
employee is discharged. Id. at 1042. 
Then, in Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P. 2d 
483, 485 (Utah 1989), four members of the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that at least some principles of public policy limit the unbridled 
exercise of employer discretion in the discharge of an indefinite-
term employee. Caldwell cautioned that the public policy exception 
could not be read so broadly as to impose a requirement of "good 
cause" for the discharge of every indefinite-term employee. Id. at 
485 6c 485 n. 2. 
The "so-called public policy exception to the at-will 
doctrine," Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 168 (Utah 
1991) (opinion of Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result), seems 
to be a recognized limitation in Utah courts. It is very clear, 
however, that this exception applies "only [to] those public 
policies that are 'clear' and 'substantial7 and arise from statutes 
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or constitutions." Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P. 2d 
949, 960 (Utah 1992), (opinion of Zimmerman, J., quoting Justice 
Durham in Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1992)). 
Accord see Hodges, 811 P.2d at 166 (recognizing the public policy 
exception may be applied to criminal statutory prohibitions which 
"provide narrow and clear-cut definitions of a specific public 
policy designed to protect both society at large and specific 
individuals from antisocial acts"). 
Thus, recognition of the public policy limitation is narrowly 
confined. 
3. There is no basis for recognizing the public policy 
limitation in this case. 
Broadbent has claimed, in very general terms, that her 
termination from the School District indirectly violated her right 
to advocate for a handicapped child's statutory rights under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. Such a convoluted claim does not 
state a public policy violation. 
In Larson v. Sysco Corp., 767 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah 1989) the 
Court, applying Idaho law, addressed a claim that the manner of a 
commissioned salesman's termination did not comply with the 
provision of the written employment contract governing notice prior 
to termination. The Court noted, "At bottom, Larson's defense to 
his termination is nothing more than a challenge to his employer's 
determination that his performance was poor." Id. The Court then 
concluded: 
[T]he public policy exception only protects employees who 
refuse to commit unlawful acts, who perform important public 
obligations, or who exercise certain legal rights or 
10 
privileges. 
Id. at 559-560, citations omitted. 
Other states have similarly refused to extend the public 
policy exception to circumstances such as presented here. For 
example, the court in Haburiak v. Prudential Bache Securities, 
Inc. , 759 F.Supp. 293 (W.D.N.C. 1991), after a careful review of 
North Carolina's treatment of the exception, concluded: 
[T]he public policy exception to the employment at-will 
doctrine is limited to those instances in which an 
employer affirmatively instructs an employee to violate 
the law. Because Plaintiff has failed to introduce any 
evidence that Defendant instructed him to violate the 
law, summary judgment on this claim will be granted. 
Id. at 298-301. 
Significantly, the exception has never been applied to matters 
of judgment, which is what is at issue here.2 See for example 
Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 451 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. 
1982) (holding summary judgment appropriate because dispute 
ultimately leading to plaintiff's discharge was not one of his 
blowing the whistle about false book entries, but rather involved 
a matter of judgment as to appropriate accounting techniques). 
Further, no exception is recognized if the public policy 
allegedly violated is too general or broad. In Bruffett v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 1982), the Third 
2As described in the Statement of Facts section of this brief, 
there is a factual dispute over what was in the best interests of 
the child, "J.B." -- Broadbent believed he should be identified as 
handicapped; whereas Landeen believed his interests would best be 
met otherwise. See Addendum B. Such a difference of opinion does 
not meet the stringent "clear and substantial" standard required 
for recognition of the public policy exception. 
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Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, concluded that a complaint, 
alleging that an aged employee working under an at-will contract 
was terminated solely because of his age, did not state a cause of 
action for violation of state public policy. That court reasoned 
that the state human rights act declaring public policy against age 
discrimination did not create a specific, independent common-law 
cause of action for unlawful discharge. Id. 
Similarly, the Colorado Court of Appeals, in Lampe v. 
Presbyterian Med. Center, 590 P.2d 513, 514-15 (Colo. App. 1978) 
declined to extend Colorado tort law to cover plaintiff's claim the 
public policy exception applied to her at-will employment. 
Specifically, Lampe alleged that she was discharged for acting in 
accordance with Colorado's general statement of policy contained in 
statutes which give the state Nursing Board authority to discipline 
nurses who negligently or willfully act in a manner inconsistent 
with the health or safety of persons under their care. She argued 
that the public policy enunciated in these statutes imposed on her 
a responsibility to take certain actions, and that her job was 
terminated because she attempted to fulfill that responsibility. 
Lampe characterized her termination as "retaliatory." Id. at 515. 
The court held: 
Given the general language used in the statute relied on 
in this case, we cannot impute to the General Assembly an 
intent to modify the contractual relationships between 
hospitals and their employees in such situations. 
Neither can we impute an intent to create a claim for 
12 
relief based on a mere possibility of disciplinary 
action. 
Id. at 515-516. 
Based on the foregoing, there is insufficient basis in this 
case to recognize a public policy exception to the at-will 
doctrine. As Associate Chief Justice Howe wrote in his concurring 
opinion in Peterson; 
I write to underscore that the public policy exception is 
to be applied narrowly and only when there exists a 
violation of a clear and substantial public policy. 
Accordingly, I do not contemplate that the exception will 
be frequently invoked or that it should be of concern to 
employers who are guided by honesty in their employment 
relations. 
832 P.2d at 1285. There is no evidence before this Court that the 
School District acted dishonestly. There is simply no clear and 
substantial basis in public policy to intervene in the District's 
right to replace an insubordinate teacher. 
B. Even if there were a sufficient basis, a claim premised on 
the public policy exception to wrongful discharge sounds in tort, 
not contract. 
In the seminal case of Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 
1281 (Utah 1992), the Court held that the public policy exception 
may apply to allegations that an employee was terminated for 
refusing to commit an unlawful act. The question of whether this 
exception sounded in tort or contract was certified by the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah.3 The Supreme Court 
3The same question was certified and answered by the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma in Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 28 (Okla. 
1989), in which that court held: "An employer's termination of an 
at-will employee in contravention of a clear mandate of public 
policy is a tortious breach of contractual obligations." In fact, 
the majority of courts addressing the question have reached a 
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answered that the exception sounds in tort. Id. at 1285.4 Accord 
DuBois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Utah App. 1994) 
(holding an implied covenant of good faith cannot change an 
indefinite-term, at-will employment contract into a contract that 
requires an employer to have good cause to justify a discharge); 
Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991) 
(holding former employee's termination by former employer did not 
constitute breach of contract where there was no evidence that 
employment relationship was other than at-will); Amos v. 
Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 594 F.Supp. 791, 829 (D. Utah 
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 483 U.S. 327, 97 L.Ed.2d 273, 107 
S.Ct. 2862 (1985) (holding at-will employee's claim of wrongful 
discharge not actionable under contract). 
Thus, even if this Court were to recognize a basis for the 
similar conclusion. "Of those courts recognizing the public policy 
exception to the at-will doctrine, the overwhelming majority adopt 
the tort theory." Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1284, 1284 & n. 5, 
citations omitted. 
4Justice Zimmerman wrote a lengthy concurring and dissenting 
opinion in the Peterson case in which he recommended a two-layered 
course of recovery, preferring contract recovery to tort. He 
wrote, "I see contract damages as sufficient to make an employee 
whole in the ordinary case, but would permit the discharged 
employee to seek any of the traditional tort remedies if he or she 
could prove an independent tort." 832 P.2d at 1288. Nearly seven 
months later, Justice Zimmerman wrote the lead opinion in the 
Retherford case in which he noted that "the tort of discharge in 
violation of public policy differs in both scope and sanction from 
any contractual provision that might limit an employer's power to 
discharge an employee for other than just cause." 844 P.2d at 959. 
Zimmerman added, "Both respect for precedent and sound public 
policy compel the conclusion that the tort of discharge in 
violation of public policy should be available to all employees 
regardless of their contractual status." Id. at 959-960. It would 
therefore seem that the Utah Supreme Court is now in agreement that 
discharge in violation of public policy sounds in tort. 
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public policy exception, since it sounds in tort, not contract, 
there is no waiver of immunity. 
POINT II 
BROADBENT CANNOT RECOVER BASED ON ALLEGED 
VIOLATION OF THE EDUCATOR EVALUATION ACT. 
A. There is no basis, either stated or implied, to assume the 
Legislature intended the EEA to provide a private cause of action. 
The Educator Evaluation Act, at least implicitly, was drafted 
to protect school authorities from claims of negligence in hiring 
or retaining incompetent or otherwise unsuitable teachers. See 
"Collateral References," Utah Code Ann. § 53A-10-101 (1992). The 
stated statutory purpose is: "The desired purposes of evaluation 
are to allow the educator and the school district to promote the 
professional growth of the teacher, to identify and encourage 
teacher behaviors which contribute to student progress, to identify 
teachers according to their abilities, and to improve the education 
system." Id. Conspicuously absent is language requiring the 
district to attempt to remediate a provisional educator who is 
considered insubordinate. Also absent is language granting an 
educator the right to sue for wrongful discharge or breach of 
contract should the school district determine remediation would not 
be useful. 
B. Generally, the rights recognized for wrongful discharge of 
an at-will employee are severely limited; specifically, no 
cognizable claim has been stated by Broadbent. 
It is generally held that school boards need not have "good 
cause" to terminate provisional teachers. See Moore v. Utah 
Technical College, 727 P. 2d 634, 637 (Utah 1986) (recognizing there 
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is no property interest in continued employment if educator is non-
tenured) ; accord Elwell v. Bd. of Educ. of Park City, 626 P. 2d 460, 
463 (Utah 1981) (holding there is no due process violation based on 
board's failure to renew provisional employee's contract); see 
also, Toshiba American, Inc. v. Simmons, 480 N.Y.S.2d 28, 32 (N.Y. 
1984); Wesockes v. Powers Sch. Dist. No. 31, 646 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. 
App. 1982); Maddox v. Clackamas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 25, 626 P.2d 
924, 926 (Or. App. 1981) 
While it may be a harsh result in some cases, there are rare 
exceptions to this general rule. School boards are overwhelmingly 
supported in their determinations not to renew provisional teaching 
contracts. See for example Abbott v. Bd. of Educ. of Nebo Sch. 
Dist. , 558 P. 2d 1307, 1308 (Utah 1976) . Of course, provisional 
teachers are allowed to quit without cause. Absent bilateral 
contractual modifications not present or argued here, the freedom 
to cancel provisional status is not generally abridged. 
This result has even been reached in instances where the 
educator is not probationary, as in Piacitelli v. Southern Utah 
State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Utah 1981). In Piacitelli, 
the Court held that so long as the substantial interests which a 
college's termination procedures are designed to safeguard are in 
fact satisfied and protected, the college's failure to conform to 
every technical detail of the procedures is not actionable. 
Similarly, there is no basis for Broadbent's claim that technical 
adherence to the provisions of the EEA are actionable. She was an 
at-will employee with no expectation of continued employment. The 
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existence of the E^A adds nothing to her status. 
C. Even if there were violations of the provisions of the 
EEA, there is no basis for a private cause of action. 
Moreover, even if there were a clear statutory violation of 
the provisions of the Educator Evaluation Act, Broadbent cannot 
base an independent cause of action on such a violation. In a case 
which is directly applicable to the present case, Schofield v. 
Richland Cty. Sch. Dist., 447 S.E.2d 189 (S.C. 1994), attached as 
Addendum B, the Supreme Court of South Carolina addressed a claim 
by a provisional teacher that the trial judge erred in applying a 
section of the South Carolina Code which is very similar to Utah's. 
Specifically, the trial judge ruled that S.C. Code Ann. § 59-26-40 
(1990) did not require the school district to provide remedial 
procedures for performance concerns prior to its refusal to rehire 
the teacher. Id. at 191. The court noted that the teacher's 
contract was not renewed based on performance concerns that arose 
independently of any evaluation process. Id. Therefore, "the 
trial judge properly held that section 59-26-40 does not mandate 
renewal of a provisional contract even when a teacher has performed 
adequately." Id.5 
The Schofield case applies to the present facts. The 
disagreement over the status of J.B. and Broadbent's refusal to 
interestingly, the South Carolina Supreme Court also rejected 
the teacher's argument that it was against public policy to allow 
the school district to refuse to renew a provisional contract based 
on "perceived teaching deficiencies when no remedial action had 
been afforded." 447 S.E.2d at 191. The court concluded that the 
"school district's actions were not inconsistent the public policy 
of this state." Id. at 192. 
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follow her supervisor's direction arose independently of 
evaluations undertaken in the ordinary course of her term as a 
provisional teacher. Thus, even if her evaluations were adequate 
and even if she weren't offered remediation, there can be no basis 
for recovery. 
A similar result was reached in Leonard v. Converse Cty. Sch. 
Dist. No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Wyo. 1990) in which that court 
held: 
In this case, the School District argues that it adopted 
the evaluation policy primarily for use in performing 
operational and supervisory duties and not for the 
primary purpose of protecting initial contract teachers. 
We agree. The evaluation rules did not protect initial 
contract teachers from dismissal because, as teachers 
without tenure, they could be dismissed even after 
receiving favorable evaluations. In addition, the policy 
stated that the primary purpose for teacher supervision 
and evaluation was to develop staff and improve teaching. 
We hold that, even if the evaluation rules had a 
secondary purpose relating to termination or retention, 
they did not give initial contract teachers a claim to, 
entitlement to, or reasonable expectation of 
reemployment. The School District's failure to follow 
the evaluation requirements did not result in an 
arbitrary and capricious decision to terminate Leonard's 
employment. 
Id. at 1121, citations omitted, emphasis added. In accord Roberts 
v. Lincoln Ctv. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 676 P.2d 577, 581 (Wyo. 1984) 
(upholding a school district's decision to terminate the employment 
of an initial contract teacher despite its failure to follow 
required evaluation procedures); Hopp v. Oroville Sch. Dist. No. 
410, 639 P.2d 872, 876 (Wash. App. 1982) (holding that even though 
the applicable statute referred to both certified and provisional 
teachers, the probationary provisions and the valuative criteria 
did not apply to plaintiff, a provisional teacher who had no 
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constitutional "property" interest in public employment). See 
generally, O'ROURKE, M., Nonrenewal of Teacher Contracts: A Primer 
on South Dakota Statutory and Case Law, 39 So.Dak.L.Rev. 237 
(1994) . 
Because there is no express or implied private right of action 
under the EEA,6 summary judgment on behalf of the School District 
was properly entered. 
P. The Educator Evaluation Act does not alter the contractual 
relationship between the parties and does not support a contract 
based claim. 
As a matter of contract between the parties, provisional 
employees of the School District have no right or expectation of 
continued employment beyond the current school year in which they 
are employed. See Cache County School Board's Policies and 
6Broadbent's arguments on this point are unavailing. In fact, 
the only Utah case she cites in support of her theory that she 
should be entitled to civil damages for "violations" of the EEA is 
Griffin v. Memmott, 814 P.2d 601 (Utah App. 1991) where this court 
refused to recognize a private right of action was created by a 
federal statute. The Griffin court noted: 
The following four factors are informative in 
ascertaining [the] intent [of Congress]: (1) whether the 
plaintiff is a member of a class for whose special 
benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether Congress 
intended to create or deny a private remedy; (3) whether 
a private remedy would be consistent with the statute's 
underlying purposes; and (4) whether the cause of action 
traditionally is relegated to state law. 
Id. at 602, citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 
2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). Applying these factors, the Griffin 
court concluded that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 
1976 (FLPMA) did not expressly create a right of action in private 
parties for non-compliance with its requirements. Id. Further, 
such a right would be "out of harmony with the intended purpose and 
effect" of the statute. Id. at 602-603. The court concluded that 
"FLPMA's only conceivable benefit is to the BLM, and its purpose is 
to serve the BLM's administrative objectives, not those of private 
claimants," Id. at 603, and therefore, there was no basis for a 
private cause of action, Id. at 604. 
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Procedures, sections III.7.6.b. and III.10.9.a.l., R. 43 - 57; 
Abbott v. Bd. of Educ. of Nebo Sch. Dist., 558 P.2d 1307 (Utah 
1976) . 
The language of the EEA does nothing to vary the contractual 
expectations, nor does the EEA create or imply the existence of an 
additional contract. In Prows v. State of Utah, 822 P. 2d 764 (Utah 
1991), the plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, based on 
defendants' alleged failure to pay statutorily required 
assessments. The Court disposed of the breach of contract claim, 
ruling that a statutory obligation does not give rise to a 
contract. The Court held: 
It is well recognized that the performance of a duty 
imposed by law is insufficient consideration to support 
a contract. Therefore, we conclude that statutorily 
mandated assessment payments do not constitute 
consideration sufficient to support a contract. 
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim fails as a matter of 
law. 
822 P.2d at 768, citations omitted. 
Likewise, alleged obligations arising under the EEA "do not 
constitute consideration sufficient to support a contract." The 
existence of the EEA does not give rise to new contractual rights 
and obligations between the parties, outside the negotiated 
policies and procedures which form part of the contract between 
them. The express contract between the parties, as contained in 
the School District's policies and procedures, makes it clear that 
Broadbent, as a provisional teacher, had no right to or expectation 
of continued employment beyond the 1991-92 school year, and the 
School District was free to non-renew her contract at will. 
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The fact that Broadbent cannot support a contract theory of 
recovery against the District is fatal to her claims since they are 
barred by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THERE WERE A BASIS FOR A PRIVATE CAUSE 
OF ACTION, BROADBENT'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY 
THE IMMUNITY PROVISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT. 
A. There is no waiver of governmental immunity for the tort 
of wrongful discharge. 
It is uncontested by either party that the School District is 
a governmental entity as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(3), 
(7) (1993). It is also uncontested that the School District was 
performing a governmental function as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-2(4) (a)# (b) (1993). Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
3(1) (1993), providing that all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function, applies to this case. Thus, absent a 
specific waiver, the School District is immune. 
Broadbent asks that this Court reverse the prior decisions of 
the Utah Supreme Court and determine that her wrongful discharge 
claim lies in contract. She makes this plea based on the waiver of 
immunity for contractual obligations found in section 63-30-5 of 
the immunity act. However, even if this Court were to entertain 
the argument that it can overturn the precedent of the Utah Supreme 
Court, her request does not satisfy Menzies' careful requirements 
for overruling prior case law. State v. Menzies, 879 P. 2d 393, 395 
& n. 3 (Utah 1994), cited in White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371, 
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1373 (Utah 1994). 
Furthermore, Broadbent has not alleged malice or fraud for 
which a waiver would be recognized under section 63-30-4(4) . She 
has not claimed a dangerous or defective condition for which a 
waiver of immunity would be recognized under sections 63-30-8 and 
9. And she has not claimed negligence for which a waiver could be 
recognized under section 63-30-10. 
The ineluctable result is there is no basis upon which to 
recognize a waiver of immunity for the intentional tort of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy. 
B. Nor is there a waiver for claims brought pursuant to the 
Educator Evaluation Act. 
Similarly, since there is no basis in contract to recover 
under the EEA, even if there were an alternative theory of 
recovery,7 Broadbent's claims against the District fail. Again, 
the District is immunized from suit by the general grant of 
immunity contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (1993). Ledfors 
v. Emery Cty. Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993) . Because 
there are no applicable waivers to immunity recognized for an 
alleged violation of the EEA, the District's "blanket immunity" 
remains intact. Id. 
Thus, Broadbent's claims based on a private right of action 
for an alleged violation of the provisions of the Educator 
Evaluation Act also fail as a matter of law. 
7The breach of a noncontractual statutory duty, if any action 
lies, is tortious in character. DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 
P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983); Julesburg Sch. Dist. No. RE-1, Etc. v. 
Ebke, 562 P.2d 419, 421 (Colo. 1977). 
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CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment was appropriate in this case. Broadbent's 
claim under the public policy exception to the employment at-will 
doctrine, even if supportable, is barred as an intentional tort 
claim against a governmental entity performing a governmental 
function. Additionally, because the EEA includes no provisions for 
private causes of action, provides no claim of relief and provides 
no additional or modifying contractual rights, Broadbent has failed 
to state a basis for recovery for which immunity has been waived. 
Consequently, the trial court's order in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiff should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/^_?f day of April, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
ELIZABETH KING 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
63-29-1 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 29 
UTAH STATE FIRE PREVENTION LAW 
(Repealed in part by Laws 1985, ch. 40, § 5; 1991, ch. 220, § 25; renumbered by L. 
1991, ch. 220, §§ 1 to 22.) 
63-29-1 to 63-29-27. Renumbered. 
Renumbered. — Laws 1991, ch. 220 renum-
bered most of the sections in this chapter, the 
Utah State Fire Prevention Law, as present 
Chapter 27 of this title, effective April 29, 
1991. Section 25 of that act repealed former 
§ 63-29-9, as last amended by L. 1965, ch. 137, 
§ 4; § 63-29-11, as enacted by L. 1963, ch. 156, 
§ 11; § 63-29-12, as enacted by L. 1965, ch. 
137, § 7; §§ 63-29-13 and 63-29-15, as enacted 
by L. 1969, ch. 204, §§ 1,3; and § 63-29-25 and 
§ 63-29-26, as enacted by L. 1971, ch. 157, 
§§ 6, 7. Section 63-29-8, as amended by L. 
1985, ch. 236, § 4, was repealed by L. 1985, ch. 
40, § 5. 
Laws 1991, ch. 157, § 2 amended former 
§ 63-29-9 and Laws 1991, ch. 202, § 6 
amended former § 63-29-12, but the amend-
ments have not been given effect because of the 
repeal of those sections. 
CHAPTER 29a 
LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS BOARD 
(Renumbered by Laws 1993, ch. 234, §§ 324 to 338) 
63-29a-101 to 63-29a-112. Renumbered. 
Renumbered. — Laws 1993, ch. 234, troleum gas, as §§ 53-7-302 to 53-7-316, effec-
§§ 324 to 338 renumber §§ 63-29a-101 to tive July 1, 1993. 
63-29a-112, regulating the use of liquefied pe-
CHAPTER 30 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Section 
63-30-2. 
63-30-3. 
63-30-4. 
63-30-5. 
63-30-7. 
63-30-8. 
Definitions. 
Immunity of governmental en-
tities from suit. 
Act provisions not construed as 
admission or denial of liabil-
ity — Effect of waiver of im-
munity — Exclusive remedy 
— Joinder of employee — 
Limitations on personal lia-
bility. 
Waiver of immunity as to con-
tractual obligations. 
Repealed. 
Waiver of immunity for injury 
caused by defective, unsafe, 
or dangerous condition of 
highways, bridges, or other 
structures. 
Section 
63-30-9. 
63-30-10. 
63-30-10.5. 
63-30-10.6. 
63-30-U. 
Waiver of immunity for injury 
from dangerous or defective 
public building, structure, or 
other public improvement — 
Exception. 
Waiver of immunity for injury 
caused by negligent act or 
omission of employee — Ex-
ceptions. 
Waiver of immunity for taking 
private property without 
compensation. 
Attorneys' fees for records re-
quests. 
Claim for injury — Notice — 
Contents — Service — Legal 
disability. 
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Section 
63-30-18 
63-30-22 
63-30-28. 
63-30-33 
Compromise and settlement of 
actions 
Exemplary or punitive damages 
prohibited — Governmental 
entity exempt from execu-
tion, attachment, or garnish-
ment 
Liability insurance — Purchase 
of insurance or self-insurance 
by governmental entity au-
thorized — Establishment of 
trust accounts for self-insur-
ance 
Liability insurance — Insur-
ance for employees autho-
rized — No right to mdemni-
Section 
63-30-34 
63-30-35 
63-30-36 
fication or contribution from 
governmental agency 
Limitation of judgments 
against governmental entity 
or employee — Insurance cov-
erage exception 
Expenses of attorney general, 
general counsel for state judi-
ciary, and general counsel for 
the Legislature in represent-
ing the state, its branches, 
members, or employees 
Defending government em-
ployee — Request — Cooper-
ation — Payment of judg-
ment 
63-30-1. Short title. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
m Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitu-
tional Law, 1990 Utah L Rev 129 
Journal of Energy, Natural Resources 
and Environmental Law. — Government Li-
ability for Seismic Hazards in Utah, 11 J En-
ergy, Nat Resources & Envtl L 69 (1990) 
A.L.R. — Construction and application of 
Federal Tort Claims Act provision excepting 
from coverage claims arising out of interfer-
ence with contract rights (28 USCS § 2680(h)), 
92 A L R Fed 186 
Application of collateral source rule m ac-
tions under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 USCS 
§ 2674), 104 A.L R Fed 492 
Appealability, under collateral order doc-
trine, of order denying qualified immunity in 
42 USCS § 1983 or Bivens action for damages 
where claim for equitable relief is also pending 
— post-Harlow cases, 105 A L R Fed 851 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, em-
ployees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing 
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of 
an advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section 
62A-4-603, student teachers certificated in accordance with Section 
53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing services 
to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program, vol-
unteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsec-
tion (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position re-
ceives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivi-
sions as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opera-
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or 
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is char-
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acterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental func-
tion, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential 
to or not essential to a government or governmental fiinction, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any depart-
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of prop-
erty, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property 
damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, 
public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or 
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, es-
tate, or interest in real or personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, depart-
ment, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
History; L. 1965, ch. 139, I 2; 1973, ch. Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1; ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "offi-
1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st cers and employees in accordance with Section 
S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338; 1991, ch. 62A-4-603" near the middle of Subsection 
248, § 6. (2)(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"State." Pharmaceutical & Diagnostic Servs., Inc. v. 
The University of Utah is an arm of the state University of Utah, 801 F. Supp. 508 (D. Utah 
for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes. 1990). 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical 
programs and services performed at a state-owned university hospital are 
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and 
are considered to be governmental functions: 
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or physician be-
cause of the high risk nature of the patient's medical condition; 
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a state-
owned university hospital or provided in Utah only by physicians 
employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their 
employment; 
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care 
or treatment at another medical facility in Utah; and 
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(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned uni-
versity hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned univer-
sity acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds is 
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state, 
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the limits established in 
Section 63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess claim to the Board 
of Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6. 
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmen-
tal entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental 
entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from those activities. 
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from their joint intergovernmental functions 
at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27, 
§ 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985, 
ch. 93, § 1; 1991, ch. 15, § 1; 1991, ch. 248, 
§ 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment by ch. 15, effective April 29, 1991, added 
Subsection (2) and added Subsection designa-
tions (1) and (3). 
ANALYSIS 
Building code. 
Construction and application. 
Creek drainage system. 
Equitable claims. 
Flood control. 
Governmental function. 
Prisoners. 
Schools and school districts. 
Subdivision plan approval. 
Takings clause claim. 
Water storage tank. 
Building code. 
A city municipal corporation, its agents, and 
its architectural consultant were immune from 
suit by plaintiffs who had purchased and reno-
vated a hotel in the city and in order to enjoy 
certain tax advantages wanted to obtain an oc-
cupancy permit, but the city's hired architec-
tural firm reported code violations and the city 
denied the occupancy permit. D.C.A. Dev. 
Corp. v. Ogden City Mun. Corp., 965 F.2d 827 
(10th Cir. 1992). 
Construction and application. 
The 1984 amendment to this section could 
not be applied retroactively to bar a valid 
cause of action that had already arisen when 
the amendment went into effect. Irvine v. Salt 
Lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989); Rocky 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 248, effective 
April 29, 1991, added the subsection designa-
tions and added present Subsection (4). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989). 
Creek drainage system. 
Construction, operation, and maintenance of 
a creek drainage system was a governmental 
function. Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989). 
Equitable claims. 
In accord with bound volume. See Bennett v. 
Bow Valley Dev. Corp., 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 
1990); Shoreline Dev., Inc. v. Utah County, 190 
Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Flood control. 
The grant of immunity for flood control ac-
tivities mentioned in the second paragraph is 
subject to the exception mentioned in the first 
paragraph. Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 
P.2d 838 (Utah 1990); Provo City Corp. v. State 
ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 795 P.2d 1120 (Utah 
1990). 
In amending this section in 1984, the Legis-
lature intended to specify flood control activi-
ties as governmental functions, thus bringing 
those activities within the Governmental Im-
munity Act. Thus, the second paragraph of this 
section is subject to the waiver provisions 
found in the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Provo City Corp. v. State ex rel. Dep't of 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Transp, 795 P 2d 1120 (Utah 1990), Hambhn 
v City of Clearfield, 795 P2d 1133 (Utah 
1990) 
Governmental function. 
The issuance of permits and certificates of 
occupancy and the administering of building 
inspections as identified by the legislature m 
k 63-30-10 are "core" governmental functions, 
so that a county's negligent acts or omissions 
relating to those functions are expressly ex-
cepted from waiver of immunity DeBry v Salt 
Lake County, 188 Utah Adv Rep 55 (Ct App 
1992) 
Prisoners. 
Bailiffs action against state for gunshot 
wound inflicted by a prisoner was properly dis-
missed, because either (1) the prisoner had 
totally escaped the control of the officers es-
corting him and was thus acting on his own so 
the officers were not responsible for him, or (2) 
he was still under the control of the officers, in 
which case the officers would be immune from 
suit under the statute Kirk v State, 784 P 2d 
1255 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
Schools and school districts. 
School, in pumping water out of its base-
ment, was not engaged as a governmental en-
tity in the "management of flood waters" so as 
to be immune from suit Branam v Provo 
School Dist, 780 P 2d 810 (Utah 1989) 
School district was not shielded from possi-
ble liability for damages arising from its negli-
gence in the resurfacing of a school parking lot, 
which resulted in surface water runoff on an 
adjoining landowner's property Williams v 
Carbon County Bd of Educ, 780 P 2d 816 
(Utah 1989) 
Subdivision plan approval. 
The inspection and acceptance of subdivision 
improvements are governmental functions for 
which immunity has not been waived Bennett 
v Bow Valley Dev Corp , 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 
1990) 
Takings clause claim. 
Governmental immunity does not preclude 
the bringing of a suit under Amendment V of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution in a proper 
case Bennett v Bow Valley Dev Corp , 797 
P 2d 419 (Utah 1990) 
Water storage tank. 
Where owners of residential property alleged 
that a city's water storage tanks leaked water 
into their residential subdivision, causing or 
adding to landslide problems that obstructed 
the free use of their property, the court, on ap-
peal, held that the maintenance of a water 
storage tank is not uniquely governmental or 
essential to the core of governmental activity 
Bennett v Bow Valley Dev Corp , 797 P 2d 
419 (Utah 1990) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitu-
tional Law, 1990 Utah L Rev 129 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or de-
nial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — 
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Lim-
itations on personal liability. 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may 
be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility by or 
for governmental entities or their employees. 
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued 
is granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity 
were a private person. 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by any waiver of 
immunity in this chapter, nor may any provision of this chapter be con-
strued as imposing strict liability or absolute liability. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely affecting any 
immunity from suit that a governmental entity or employee may otherwise 
assert under state or federal law. 
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(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action under this chapter 
against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury caused by an 
act or omission that occurs during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a 
plaintiffs exclusive remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or pro-
ceeding based upon the same subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, 
unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice; or 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth in 
Subsection 63-30-36(3)(c). 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity 
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for 
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of author-
ity, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to 
fraud or malice. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 4; 1978, ch. 27, 
§ 3; 1983, ch. 129, § 3; 1991, ch. 76, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added Subsec-
tions (l)(c) and (3)(b)(ii); added the Subsection 
(a) and (b) designations in Subsection (1) and 
added the subsection designations in Subsec-
tion (3); substituted "may" for "shall" in Sub-
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Official sued in representative capacity. 
Personal liability. 
—Applicability of section. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
This section does not violate the open courts 
provision, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 11. DeBry 
v. Salt Lake County, 188 Utah Adv. Rep. 55 
(Ct. App. 1992). 
Official sued in representative capacity. 
Claim against chairman of the University of 
Utah's Department of Radiology in his individ-
ual capacity was dismissed since there was lit-
tle doubt that his "acts or omissions," if any, 
sections (l)(a) and (2), substituted "Except as 
provided in Subsection (b), an action under this 
chapter" for "The remedy" and "a plaintiffs ex-
clusive remedy" for "after the effective date of 
this act, exclusive of in Subsection (3)(a); and 
made minor stylistic and punctuation changes 
throughout the section. 
occurred during the performance of his duties 
as chairman but the complaint did not allege 
that he acted with either fraud or malice. 
Pharmaceutical & Diagnostic Servs., Inc. v. 
University of Utah, 801 F. Supp. 508 (D. Utah 
1990). 
Personal liability. 
—Applicability of section. 
Asserted acts of sex discrimination and ha-
rassment against a former county employee 
did not amount to "fraud or malice" within the 
meaning of Subsections (3) and (4) of this sec-
tion. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735 F. Supp. 
381 (D. Utah 1990). 
Cited in Naugle v. Witney, 755 F. Supp. 
1504 (D. Utah 1990). 
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63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any 
contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations 
shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 
63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of Water Resources is not 
liable for failure to deliver water from a reservoir or associated facility autho-
rized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to 
deliver the contractual amount of water is due to drought, other natural 
condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in the amount of avail-
able water. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 5; 1975, ch. ment, effective April 29, 1991, designated the 
189, § 1; 1978, ch. 27, § 4; 1983, ch. 129, § 4; existing provisions as Subsection (1) and added 
1985, ch. 82, § 1; 1991, ch. 251, § 1. Subsection (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 141 (Utah 1990). 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving prop-
erty. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Scope of section. ing damage or destruction of private property 
This section waives immunity only for ac- by a governmental entity does not fall within 
tions to recover property, quiet title, clear title, the grant of immunity in this section. Hansen 
or resolve disputes over mortgages or liens
 v . Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990). 
held by a governmental entity; a claim alleg-
63-30-7. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1991, ch. 76, § 10 repeals negligent operation of motor vehicles, with ex-
§ 63-30-7, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch. ceptions, effective April 29, 1991. 
204, § 1, waiving immunity for injury from 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set 
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, 
viaduct, or other structure located on them. 
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History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8; 1991, ch. 76, the injury arises out of one or more of the ex-
§ 2. ceptions to waiver set forth in Section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- 63-30-10," and made several stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added "Unless 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Duty to maintain. to maintain its sidewalk in a reasonably safe 
Settled law governing liability for unsafe condition; the city did have a duty to maintain 
street and sidewalk conditions warranted a re- physical facilities Trapp v. Salt Lake City 
versal of a grant of summary judgment on the Corp., 190 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (1992). 
grounds that a city did not owe plaintiff a duty 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or 
defective public building, structure, or other 
public improvement — Exception. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set 
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any 
public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 9; 1991, ch. 76, ceptions to waiver set forth in Section 
§ 3. 63-30-10," and made a minor punctuation 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- change and deleted the former second sen-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added "Unless tence, which read: "Immunity is not waived for 
the injury arises out of one or more of the ex- latent defective conditions." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989). 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proxi-
mately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prose-
cution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, inter-
ference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of 
civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent 
or intentional; 
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(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(8) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any 
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining oper-
ation, or any activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and For-
estry; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for 
the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disas-
ters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accor-
dance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, 
or other structure located on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public 
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; or 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or haz-
ardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. 1991, added Subsections (13) through (17) and 
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1; redesignated former Subsection (13) as present 
1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989, Subsection (18), inserted "violation of before 
ch. 268, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. "civil rights" in Subsection (2), deleted "of any 
319, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, § 4. property" following "inspection" in Subsection 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
 (4 ) ) m a d e m i n o r gtyhstic changes in Subsec-
ment by ch 15 effective July 1^  1990, deleted
 t i o n s ( 6 ) a n d ( 1 2 ) ) ^ d r e w r o t e Subsection (11), 
the subsection designation (1) from the begin-
 w h k h r e a d . « n a t u r a l c o n d l t l o n o n s t a t e 
mng of he section redesignated former Sub-
 l a n d s o r a g t h e r e g u l t o f a c t i v i a u t h o r i 2 e d 
sections (l)(a) to (1X1) as Subsections (1) to (13)
 fe ^ B o a r d o f g u t e J ^ ' Forestry." 
and made related changes, and deleted former * _ * 
Subsection (2), waiving immunity from suit for w*uF««* * i »***. **WD ; « , ' « ' 7 
violation of Fourth Amendment rights and w h l c h amended this section and §§ 63-30-4, 
making the provisions of Chapter 16 of Title 78 63-30-8, 63-30-9, 63-30-10.5, 63-30-11, 63-30-
the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by 33» 63-30-34, and 63-30-36, provides m § 11 
6uch violations. t n a t "Tms act has prospective effect only and 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 319, effective any changes to the law caused by this act do 
July 1, 1990, added Subsection (13)(e) and not apply to any claims based upon injuries or 
made a related stylistic change. losses that occurred before the effective date of 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, this act [April 29, 1991]." 
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CHAPTER 10 
EDUCATOR EVALUATION 
Section 
53A-10-101. 
53A-10-102. 
53A-10-103. 
53A-10-104. 
53A-10-105. 
53A-10-106. 
Legislative findings. 
Definitions. 
Establishment of educator eval-
uation program — Joint com-
mittee. 
Frequency of evaluations. 
Evaluation orientation. 
Components of educator evalua-
tion program — E valuator — 
Notice — Criteria — Re-
sponse. 
53A-10-101. Legislative find 
Section 
53A-10-107. 
53A-10-108. 
53A-10-109. 
53A-10-110. 
53A-10-11L 
ings. 
Deficiencies — Remediation. 
Consulting educator for provi-
sional educator. 
Final evaluation. 
Review of evaluation — Time 
limit on request 
Additional compensation for 
services. 
The Legislature recognizes that the quality of public education can be im-
proved and enhanced by providing for systematic, fair, and competent evalua-
tion of public educators and remediation of those whose performance is inade-
quate. The desired purposes of evaluation are to allow the educator and the 
school district to promote the professional growth of the teacher, to identify 
and encourage teacher behaviors which contribute to student progress, to 
identify teachers according to their abilities, and to improve the education 
system. 
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-101, enacted by 
L. 1988, ch. % § 135. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXIL — Liability of school authorities for 
hiring or retaining incompetent or otherwise 
unsuitable teacher, 60 AXJUth 260. 
Validity and construction of statutes, ordi-
nances, or regulations requiring competency 
tests of schoolteachers, 64 AJLR.4th 642. 
53A-10-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter. 
(1) "Career educator" means a certified employee entitled to rely upon 
continued employment under the policies of a local school board. 
(2) "Educator* means any individual, except the superintendent, em-
ployed by a school district who is required to hold a professional certifi-
cate issued by the State Board of Education. Educator does not include 
individuals who work less than three hours per day or who are hired for 
less than half of a school year. 
(3) "Probationary educator" means any educator employed by a school 
district who, under local school board policy, has been advised by the 
district that his performance is inadequate. 
(4) "Provisional educator" means any educator employed by a school 
district who has not achieved status as a career educator within the 
school district 
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History: C. 1953, 53A-10-1Q2, enacted by ment, effective April 23, 1990, deleted "as an 
L. 1988, ch- 2, § 136; 1988, ch. 233, § 3; 1990, educator" after performance* in Subsection 
ch. 78, § 25. (3). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
53A-10-103. Establishment of educator evaluation pro-
gram — Joint committee. 
(1) Each local school board shall develop an evaluation program in consul-
tation with its educators through appointment of a joint committee. 
(2) The joint committee shall be comprised of an equal number of classroom 
teachers and administrators appointed by the board. 
(3) A board may appoint members of the joint committee from a list of 
nominees voted on by classroom teachers in a nomination election and from a 
list of nominees voted on by the administrators in a nomination election. 
(4) The evaluation program developed by the joint committee must comply 
with the requirements of Section 53A-10-106. 
History; C. 1953, 53A-10-1Q3, enacted by tives and board appointees" at the end of Sub-
L. 1988, ch, 2, § 137; 1990, ch. 78, § 26. section (2) and rewrote Subsection (3), which 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- read "The classroom teachers within the dis-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted trict shall vote on a list of nominees from 
"classroom teachers and administrators ap- which the board selects the educator represen-
pointed by the board" for "educator representa- tatives." 
53A-10-104. Frequency of evaluations. 
A local school board shall provide for the evaluation of its provisional and 
probationary educators at least twice each school year. 
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-KK, enacted by 
L. 1988, ch. 2, { 138. 
53A-10-1Q5. Evaluation orientation. 
(1) The principal of each school shall orient all educators assigned to the 
school concerning the school board's educator evaluation program, including 
the purpose of the evaluations and the method used to evaluate. 
(2) Evaluations may not occur prior to the orientation by the principal. 
History: C. 1953, 53A-10.105, enacted by 
L. 1988, ch. 2, § 139. 
53A-10-106. Components of educator evaluation program 
— Evaluator — Notice — Criteria — Response. 
Any educator evaluation program adopted by a local school board in consul-
tation with a committee shall provide the following: 
(1) unless otherwise provided in the adopted program, the principal, 
the principal's designee, or the educator's immediate supervisor shall 
perform the educator evaluation; 
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(2) personal notice to the educator of the evaluation process at least 1*5 
days prior to the first evaluation and receipt of a copy of the evaluation 
instrument, if an instrument is to be used; 
(3) a reasonable number of observation periods for any evaluation to 
insure adequate opportunity for evaluation; 
(4) the use of several types of evaluation and evidence, such as self-
evaluation, student evaluation, peer evaluation, or systematic observa-
tions; 
(5) that the educator may make a written response to all or any part of 
the evaluation and that the response will be attached to the evaluation; 
(6) a reliable and valid evaluation consistent with generally accepted 
professional standards for personnel evaluation systems; and 
(7) within 15 days after the completed evaluation process the evalua-
tion in writing shall be discussed with the educator. Following any revi-
sions made after the discussion, a copy of the evaluation shall be filed in 
the educator's personnel file together with any related reports or docu-
ments. A copy of the evaluation and attachments shall be given to the 
educator. 
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-106, enacted by committee" in the introductory paragraph; 
L. 1988, ch. 2, j 140; 1988, ch. 233, § 4; 1990, substituted "provided in the adopted program 
ch- 78, i 27. for "agreed by the committee established under 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- Section 53A-10-103" in Subsection (1); inserted 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, deleted "devel- "and attachments" after "evaluation" in the 
oped by the joint committee and** after "pro- final sentence in Subsection (7); and made 
gram" and inserted "in consultation with a punctuation and stylistic changes. 
53A-10-107. Deficiencies — Remediation. 
(1) An educator whose performance is inadequate or in need of improve-
ment shall be provided with a written document clearly identifying deficien-
cies, the available resources for improvement, and a recommended course of 
action that will improve the educator's performance. 
(2) The district shall provide the educator with reasonable assistance to 
improve performance. 
(3) An educator is responsible for improving performance by using the re-
sources identified by the school district and demonstrating acceptable levels of 
improvement in the designated areas of deficiencies. 
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-107, enacted by "clearly identifying deficiencies" for "that 
L. 1988, ch. 2, $ 141; 1990, ch. 78, § 28. clearly identifies his deficiencies" in Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- tion (1) and made related changes, 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted 
53A-10-108. Consulting educator for provisional educator. 
(1) The principal or immediate supervisor of a provisional educator shall 
assign a consulting educator to the provisional educator. 
(2) If possible, the consulting educator shall be a career educator who per-
forms substantially the same duties as the provisional educator and has at 
least three years of educational experience. 
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(3) The consulting educator shall assist the provisional educator to become 
informed about the teaching profession and school system, but may not serve 
as an evaluator of the provisional teacher. 
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-108, enacted by *TW for "A" at the beginning of Subsection 
L. 1988, ch. 2, § 142; 1990, ch. 78, § 29. (1) and inserted "or after "years" in Sobeec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend* tion (2). 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted 
53A-10-109. Final evaluation. 
(1) At least 60 days prior to the end of the contract school year, the princi-
pal, immediate supervisor, or appointed evaluator of an educator whose per-
formance has been determined to be inadequate or in need of improvement, 
shall complete all written evaluations and recommendations regarding the 
educator evaluated during the contract school year. 
(2) The final evaluation shall contain only data previously considered and 
discussed with the individual educator as required in Section 53A-10-106. 
(3) Nothing in this section prevents a school district from performing sup-
plementary evaluation for good cause after the issuance of the final evalua-
tion. 
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-109, enacted by 
L> 1988, ch. 2, i 143. 
53A-10-110. Review of evaluation — Time limit on request 
(1) An educator who is not satisfied with an evaluation has 30 days after 
receiving the written evaluation to request a review of the evaluation. 
(2) If a review is requested, the district superintendent or the superinten-
dent's designee shall appoint a person, not an employee of the district, who 
has expertise in teacher or personnel evaluation to review and make recom-
mendations to the superintendent regarding the teacher's evaluation. 
(3) Nothing in this section prevents the teacher and district superintendent 
or the superintendent's designee from agreeing to another method of review. 
History: C. 1953, 53A-1O-110, enacted by ment, effective April 23,1990, substituted "the 
L. 1988, ch. 2, § 144; 1990, ch. 78, $ 30. superintendent's designee" for "his designee" 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- in Subsections (2) and (3). 
53A-10-111. Additional compensation for services. 
The district may compensate a person employed as a consulting educator or 
participant in the evaluation for those services, in addition to the person's 
regular salary, if additional time is required in the evaluation process. 
History: C. 1953, 53A-10-111, enacted by ment, effective April 23,1990, substituted "the 
L. 1988, ch. 2, § 145; 1990, ch. 78, § 31. person's" for "his." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
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scheduled appearance in another court on that from the date of notice of entry of such judg-
date, but due to fact that there were no law or ment, rather than from the date of judgment, 
motion days between time objection was filed Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re- 124,288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered & Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)). 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham- C i t e d i n U t a h S a n d & G r a v e l ****** C o rP- v. 
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
Time for appeal J P W * E n t e r s » I n c- v Naef> 6 0 4 P 2 d ^ 6 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal < U t a h 1979>> K a t z v- ^eree, 7 3 2 P 2 d 9 2 <Utah 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev 937.
 t r i a l f o r f l l i n g 0f necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments j.255 
§ V . J 1 ~ 4 1 9 2 C 3 J . S . Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
 f
 F
*
i l u ? to * v e * o t i c e of application for de-
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to lia- fault ^ ^ f^Jf^f^ r e q u u r e d ° n l y 
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. — Judgment *=> 92 to 134. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
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forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
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—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
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—Sufficiency. 
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—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
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Affirmative defense. 
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Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
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Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Compliance with rule. 
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Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
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—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
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Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Guardianship. 
—Mortgage note. 
—Negligence. 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
—Note. 
—Recovery for goods and services. 
—Stock ownership. 
—Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment proper. 
—Contract action. 
—Contract terms. 
—Deceit. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Negligence. 
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[1-3] While modern discover}' rules and [5] No other discovery procedure would 
liberal pleading requirements virtually elimi- allow the Administrator to determine the 
nate the need to report to an independent proper party to a third party complaint. Ac-
action in the form of an equitable proceeding cordmgh. we hold that the trial judge, under 
for discovery, they do not totally displace the the equitable power of the court, properly 
traditional equitable junsdiction of the court ordered Employer to allow Administrator to 
to i>sue appropriate orders for independent inspect its premises. Accord Shorey. 511 
<lM-o\ery when effecme discovery cannot A.2d at 1078 (trial court ha*- equity jurwhe-
othenvi^e be obtained and the ends of justice tion to order employee's pre-action inspection 
-jm'd. Shout/ r Lincoln Pulp S: Pa/n r of emp^er'* plant for purpn^v of n>u </t-
{'". oil A.lM 107<). 107* iMellNii The inn n ^Ivne which iniuit-d emp]<>\ee t»» dt-
• ]>i '- •' -'i ('<'"• IMJ- ,«]].>v dw«>\- T. .-r, " ,T v.;i- r«*j'V« i *b <]•-.:»<' ' • 
t>r vim. ilj» liiij' - do nut pruude a media- /</' /• H*** ()>t \ nuin hi(> 'K (n,j . 1<>:> 
n - o i ' L >*• fif.nl ji a, Tm tV* Rftlih, F K D. 40} (I> V.I 1'isOi (trial uidne uiu )H<] 
/'/ Jl* ^< l ] j I"iO S E.2d r>2") 'UM .^t t'n.pl«-\»i t<» wv n lnimvd empln\f - >} -
< u.ii; i» L/.j i > « r - daiiii, tin* plain l.ii v<-'L' "! <>i pn.piin t<> ik^rriihi pi ,«i 
g-uaiif «»t Rule .*Jlit» recognize- that an mile- part\ »\ po^ible third part\ action). Ba-rd 
pendent di>cu\en action may be maintained on our holding, we need not addre.^ Empl»»\-
against a non-paiiy: er's remaining arguments. 
This rule does not preclude an independent AFFIRMED. 
action against a person not a party for 
production of documents and things and CHANDLER, FINNEY, TOAL and 
permission to enter upon land. MOORE, JJ., concur. 
Rule 34(c), SCRCP.1 Accordingly, we reject 
Employer's claim that the trial judge was 
without authority to order discovery against 
a non-party. 
[4] We also reject Employer's claim that 
the trial judge could not order discovery in 
the absence of a civil action to which discov-
ery was relevant. While a pure bill for dis-
covery most often was brought to aid a party 
in an action at law, the pendency of such an 
action was not necessary. Shorey, 511 A.2d 
at 1078. 
The action in aid of which the discovery 
is sought may be pending; but this is not 
necessary. It is sufficient if the plaintiff in 
the bill for a discovery shows that he has a 
right to maintain or defend an action in 
another court, and that he is about to sue 
or is liable to be sued therein, although no 
action is yet commenced; a discovery may 
be needed to determine the proper par-
ties (footnotes omitted). 
John Norton Pomeroy, Equity Jurispru-
dence. § 197(b) at 298 (1941). 
1. After this action was commenced, Rule 34(c) 
was amended to include that "a person not a 
partt ma\ be compelled to produce documents of 
Margaret SCHOFIELD, Appellant, 
v. 
RICHLAND COUNTY SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT, John Stevenson, Superintendent, 
Richland County School District # 1, 
Reverend William Bowman, William 
Halligan, Leon Howard, Carol T. Lee, 
Chris Lindsay, Darrell Jackson and Jas-
per Salmond, as members of the Board 
of Richland County School District 
Number 1, Respondents. 
No. 24110. 
Supreme Court of South Carolina. 
Heard May 14, 1994. 
Decided July 5, 1994. 
Provisional teacher brought suit against 
school district which had previously em-
thmgs or submit to an inspection onK as provid-
ed in Rule 45 " 
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ployed her for district's alleged breach of 
statutory duty to provide remedial opportuni-
ties for perceived teaching deficiencies prior 
to refusing to renew her provisional contract. 
The Circuit Court, Richland County, Walter 
J. Bristow, J., entered order dismissing com-
plaint with prejudice, and teacher appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Littlejohn, Acting Asso-
ciate Justice, held that statute obligating 
school districts to give provisional teachers 
appropriate assistance to correct any defi-
ciencies observed during statutorily required 
evaluations did not require district to provide 
such assistance to remedy performance con-
cerns that arose independently of evaluation 
process. 
Affirmed. 
1. Schools <s>147.26 
Statute obligating school district to give 
provisional teachers appropriate assistance to 
correct any deficiencies observed during stat-
utorily required evaluations did not require 
district to provide such assistance to remedy 
performance concerns that arose indepen-
dently of evaluation process, nor did it pre-
vent school district, prior to providing such 
assistance, from deciding not to renew provi-
sional teacher's contract based on such per-
formance concerns. Code 1976, § 59-26-40. 
2. Schools <3=>147.2(1) 
Statute providing that provisional teach-
er wTho has performed adequately is eligible 
for renewal of contract did not mandate that 
provisional teacher's contract be renewed, 
even assuming that teacher had performed 
adequately. Code 1976, § 59-26-40. 
3. Appeal and Error 0169 
Issue not raised to or ruled upon by trial 
judge is not properly before Supreme Court 
on appeal. 
4. Schools <2»147.26 
School district's decision not to renew 
provisional teacher's contract based on per-
ceived teaching deficiencies was not against 
public policy, though no remedial procedures 
were provided to teacher to assist her in 
remedying perceived deficiencies prior to 
school district's decision not to renew; school 
district's performance concerns arose inde-
pendently of evaluation process, and it was 
only in connection with evaluation process 
that such remedial procedures were statuto-
rily required. Code 1976, § 59-26-40. 
William T. Toal, of Johnson, Toal & Bat-
tiste, Columbia, for appellant. 
Kenneth L. Childs, M. Jane Turner, and 
Andrea E. White, of Childs & Duff, Colum-
bia, for respondents. 
LITTLEJOHN, Acting Associate Justice. 
Margaret Schofield (Teacher) brought this 
action alleging that Richland County School 
District (School District) breached its duty to 
provide remedial opportunities for perceived 
teaching deficiencies before refusing to re-
new her provisional contract. Teacher 
claimed damages, costs, and reinstatement 
The trial judge, in a non-jury term, dismissed 
the complaint with prejudice on the ground 
that the School District may refuse to renew 
the contract of a provisional teacher on the 
basis of performance concerns that arise in-
dependent of the statutory evaluation and 
remediation procedures. Teacher appealed. 
We affirm. 
I. Facts 
The School District hired Teacher for the 
1990-91 school year under a provisional con-
tract in accordance with S.C.Code Ann. § 59-
26-40 (1990). At the beginning of her term, 
Teacher was given an orientation to the 
teacher evaluation process and a copy of the 
evaluation instrument, the Assessments of 
Performance in Teaching Test (APT). Dur-
ing three class instructions, Teacher wTas 
evaluated under the APT and received a 
passing score on each of these evaluations. 
During the school year, Teacher's supervi-
sors developed concerns about her discipline 
and control in the classroom, failure to pro-
vide planned, appropriate instruction, and 
uncooperative behavior. Specifically, her su-
pervisors noted an inordinate amount of 
noise often could be heard from her class-
room, her class had been playing basketball 
during required instructional times, several 
parents had complained about her behavior, 
and the teachers on her teaching team had 
SCHOFIELD 
stated that she either failed to contribute or 
missed team meetings. 
After a formal observation of Teacher's 
class in March, her principal informed her 
that she did not intend to recommend Teach-
er for reassignment to that school. Thereaf-
ter, the District Superintendent notified 
Teacher that her employment would n~t be 
continued beyond the conclusion of the 1990-
91 school year because of "concerns with her 
classroom management and quality of in-
struction." This action followed. 
II. Discussion 
[1] Teacher alleges that the trial judge 
erred in holding that section 59-26-40 did 
not require the School District to provide 
remedial procedures for all performance con-
cerns prior to its refusal to rehire her. We 
disagree. 
Section 59-26-40 provides: 
A person who receives a teaching certifi-
cate as provided in § 59-26-30 may be 
employed by any school district under a 
nonrenewable provisional contract 
Each school district shall use the evalua-
tion instrument developed in accordance 
with § 59-26-30 to observe all provisional 
teachers at least three times. The results 
of the observations must be compiled to 
constitute an evaluation and must be pro-
vided to the teacher in writing. Each 
school district shall give provisional teach-
ers appropriate advice and assistance to 
help remedy any deficiencies that are de-
tected by the three required observations. 
The advice and assistance includes, but is 
not limited to, state procedures and pro-
grams developed in accordance with § 59-
26-30. Following this remediation, those 
teachers who do not initially perform at 
the level required by the evaluation instru-
ment must be observed three more times 
and the results of the observations must be 
compiled to constitute a second evaluation. 
At the end of a one-year provisional 
contract period, the evaluation must be 
reviewed by the school district to deter-
mine if the provisional teacher has per-
formed at the level required by the evalua-
tion instrument. / / the evaluation indi-
cates that the provisional teacher has per-
v. RICHLAND COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. S. C. 191 
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formed in an adequate manner, the teach-
er is eligible for an annual contract If 
the evaluation indicates that the provision-
al teacher is deficient in teaching ability, 
the school district may employ the teacher 
for an additional year under a provisional 
contract or the district may terminate his 
employment. If employment is terminat-
ed, another school district may employ him 
under a new one-year provisional con-
t r ac t— During the one-year provisional 
contract period the employment dismissal 
provisions of Article 3, Chapter 19, and 
Article 5, Chapter 25, of Title 59 of the 
1976 Code do not apply. [Emphasis add-
ed.] 
The plain language of section 59-26-40 
requires the School District to provide reme-
dial assistance only in those areas in which 
deficiencies are noted during the three re-
quired classroom evaluations. Here, Teach-
er's contract was not renewed based on per-
formance concerns that arose independently 
of the evaluation process. Accordingly, sec-
tion 59-26-40 did not require the School 
District to provide remediation in this case. 
[2] Moreover, the plain language of sec-
tion 59-26-40 provides that even though a 
provisional teacher receives an evaluation in-
dicating he or she has performed in an ade-
quate manner, the teacher is only "eligible" 
for an annual contract. Therefore, the trial 
judge properly held that section 59-26-40 
does not mandate renewal of a provisional 
contract even when a teacher has performed 
adequately. 
[3,4] Teacher argues that it is against 
public policy to allow the School District to 
refuse to renew a provisional contract based 
on perceived teaching deficiencies when no 
remedial action has been afforded. This is-
sue was not raised to or ruled upon by the 
trial judge and, therefore, this issue is not 
properly before this Court. SSI Medical 
Services, Inc. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493. 392 S.E.2d 
789 (1990). 
Even if this argument was properly before 
the Court, we find it to be without merit. 
The Legislature recognized the importance 
of training and retaining teachers in section 
59-26-40. However, the Legislature did not 
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provide for remedial procedures for deficien-
cies noted outside the evaluations for provi-
sional teachers. In the absence of a statute 
mandating remedial procedures for all teach-
ing deficiencies noted during a provisional 
contract, we find that the School District's 
actions are not inconsistent with the public 
policy of this State. Leonard v. Converse 
Cmmty School DisU 788 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 
1990). 
The holding of the trial judge is 
AFFIRMED. 
CHANDLER, Acting C.J., FINNEY and 
MOORE, JJ., and WILLIAM P. KEESLEY, 
Acting Associate Justice, concur. 
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ARCHIE BELL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., Respondent, 
v. 
Fred Paul NORMAN and Nan N. Norman; 
Pat Edwards, d/b/a Edwards Electric, 
Inc.; Dewey Sisk, d/b/a DBS Flooring; 
Sonny Rabon, d/b/a Sonny's Plumbing; 
Citicorp Homeowners, Inc.; and The An-
chor Bank, Defendants, 
of whom Fred Paul Norman and Nan 
N. Norman are Petitioners, 
and Pat Edwards, d/b/a Edwards Electric, 
Inc., is a Respondent. 
No. 24112. 
Supreme Court of South Carolina. 
Heard May 5, 1994. 
Decided July 5, 1994. 
Appeal from Horry County, David F. 
Mclnnis, Judge. 
John R. Clarke and William Isaac Diggs, 
North Myrtle Beach, for petitioners. 
Frederick C. Parsons, III and Stephen C. 
Ouverson, Surfside Beach, for respondent 
Archie Bell Const. Co., Inc. 
0. Terfy Beverly, Conway, for respondent 
Pat Edwards, d/b/a Edwards Elec, Inc. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
TtfE COURT OF APPEALS 
PER CURIAM: 
We granted the petition for writ of certio-
rari to review the Court of Appeals* decision 
in Archie Bell Construction Company, Inc. v. 
Fred Patil Norman, et at, — S.C. , 427 
S.E.2d 689 (CtApp.1993). After careful con-
sideration we hereby dismiss the petition of 
certiorari as improvidently granted. 
Isl David W. Harwell C.J. 
/s/ A^Lee Chandler A.J. 
/s/ Ernest A. Finney, Jr. A.J. 
j*f Sear* K. Tra\ k.1. 
is/ Jgnies E. Moore A.J. 
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John C. DOYLE and Jennifer 
G. Doyle, Appellants, 
v. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, 
Respondent 
No. 24114. 
Supreme Court of South Carolina. 
Heard June 7, 1994. 
Decided July 5, 1994. 
After parties agreed to settlement with 
third party for wife's job-related injuries, 
husband brought action seeking determina-
tion of his rights to portion of settlement 
based on loss of consortium. The Circuit 
Court, Charleston County, Daniel E. Martin, 
Sr., J., granted employer's workers' compen-
